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Let Not Triepel Triumph
How To Make the Best Out of Sentenza No. 238 of 
the Italian Constitutional Court for a Global Legal 
Order
(This article has previously been published on EJIL: talk!)
The Italian Constiutional Court’s decision no. 238 of 22 Oct. 
2014 (unofficial translation into English) already inspired a 
flurry of comments in the blogosphere (see in EJIL talk! 
Christian Tams (24 Oct. 2014) and Theodor Schilling (12 Nov. 
2014); on the Verfassungsblog amongst others Filippo 
Fontanelli (27 Oct. 2014); on Opinio Juris (19 Nov. 2014); on 
the Völkerrechtsblog Felix Würkert (11 Dec. 2014)); see also 
Karin Oellers-Frahm, „Das italienische Verfassungsgericht 
und das Völkerrecht: Eine unerfreuliche Beziehung“, 
Heidelberg Journal of International Law 2015, issue 1.

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In that Sentenza, the Corte refused to give effect to the ICJ’s 
judgment (in) Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany 
v. Italy) of 3 February 2012, in which the ICJ had upheld the 
principle of state immunity against allegations of serious 
human rights violations of German state organs committed 
during the Second World War.
Sentenza No. 238 is important not only because it concerns 
the persisting tension between respecting (state) immunity 
and protecting human or fundamental rights (see for a 
recent publication Anne Peters/Evelyne Lagrange/Stefan 
Oeter/Christian Tomuschat (eds), Immunities in the Age of 
Global Constitutionalism (Leiden: Brill 2015)), but – maybe 
even more importantly – because it concerns the 
relationship between international law (in the shape of a 
judgment by the ICJ) and domestic law, as applied by a 
domestic (constitutional) court.
Just the latest item in the sequence of domestic courts’ 
resistance against decisions of international bodies  
The Corte relied on its established case-law on the effects of 
European Union law, notably on the doctrine of controlimiti 
in order to erect a barrier to the “introduction” of the ICJ 
judgment into the domestic legal order: “As was upheld 
several times by this Court, there is no doubt that the 
fundamental principles of the constitutional order and 
inalienable human rights constitute a ‘limit to the 
introduction (…) of generally recognized norms of 
international law’ (…) and serve as 
‘counterlimits’ [controlimiti] to the entry of European Union 
[and now international] law” (Sentenza No. 238, in “The law”, 
para. 3.2.).
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The Italian controlimiti-approach to European or 
international court decisions is by no means an outlier. 
Quite to the contrary, the Sentenza No. 238 is just one more 
building block in the wall of “protection” built up by 
domestic courts against “intrusion” of international law, 
relying on the precepts of their national constitution. 
Ironically, this front of resistance (which now deploys effects 
“against” Germany) had been spearheaded by the German 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG). In 
the 1970s, that Court mounted critique against an 
insufficient respect for human rights by the then European 
Community (BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974) – Solange I) and 
threatened to scrutinize EC-acts against the yardstick of 
domestic fundamental rights and to refuse to allow their 
application in Germany. In 2004, the BVerfG denied a strictly 
binding effect of the ECHR and ECtHR-judgments, and 
instead (only) ordered German authorites and courts to 
“take into account” the Convention and Strasbourg 
judgments, and only within the confines of the German Basic 
Law (BVerfGE 111, 307 (2004) – Görgülü).
How do these domestic decisions resemble each other and 
in what respects do they differ, on a purely technical level 
and in their tone? Sentenza No. 238 repeats that any 
international norm (or international judgment) which stands 
in conflict with “principi fondamentali dell’ ordinamento 
costituzionale” may not be applied by domestic institutions. 
The German BVerfG in Görgülü had marked the boundary of 
applicability of judgments of the ECtHR with exactly the 
same wording (“tragende Grundsätze der Verfassung”).
The referring court of Florence had quoted a previous 
constitutional judgment pointing to the “identità” of the 
Italian legal order. There, the Corte had “reaffirmed the 
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principle that ‘the tendency of the Italian legal order to be 
open to generally recognized norms of international law and 
international treaties is limited by the necessity to preserve 
its identity; thus, first of all, by the values enshrined in the 
Constitution’” (Sentenza No. 238, facts, para. 1.2., quoting 
Judgment No. 73/2001). This is exactly what other European 
courts have done before (albeit with regard to EU law): the 
Spanish Constitutional Court (declaration DTC 1/2004 of 13 
December 2004, Sec. II para. 3), the French Conseil 
constitutionnel (décision no 2006-540 DC of 27 July 2006, 
para. 19) and the German Constitutional Court (2 BvE 2/08
of 30 June 2009, para. 340 − Treaty of Lisbon). (See also 
Constitutional Court of Lithuania, case no 17/02-24/02-
06/03-22/04 on the priority of the state constitution over 
EU law, 14 March 2006, sec. III. para. 9.4.).
Just like the US Supreme Court’s Medellín decision (Medellín 
v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)), Sentenza No. 238 is directed 
against an ICJ judgment. Medellín also had to do with 
constitutional principles, namely with federalism and the 
separation of powers: the domestic issue here was that the 
US President had ordered implementation of the ICJ Avena
judgment in the different states. Medellín was however not 
concerned with respect for fundamental rights of 
individuals. Another difference is that Medellín held that an 
ICJ judgment was not in itself self-executing but needed a 
federal law to be implemented domestically. Sentenza No. 
238 was not concerned with self-executingness, because 
Italy had, in the statute incorporating the UN Convention on 
State Immunity, which was adopted after the ICJ judgment, 
inserted a specific provision which obliged Italian judges to 
adapt themselves to judgments of the ICJ (Law no. 5 of 14 
January 2013). Exactly that provision (Art. 3) was now 
declared unconstitutional.
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Sentenza No. 238 is in some way a follower of the ECJ Kadi
decision (ECJ, 3 September 2008, Kadi and Al Barakaat, joint 
cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, ECR 2008, I-6351), which 
the Corte quotes. But unlike Kadi, which mounts resistance 
against the Security Council and thus against a partly 
unelected and not fully representative body, Sentenza No. 
238 is directed against the International Court of Justice, a 
body of elected judges who represent all regions of the 
world (is it enough to consider it representative?). Generally 
speaking, this Court has so far enjoyed a high degree of 
acceptance. The de facto-disobedience to the ICJ seems less 
justified as a matter of principle, and implies more serious 
damage to the normativity of the international legal system 
than disobeying the Security Council.
Just like Kadi, Sentenza No. 238 insists on the fact that it has 
nothing to do with “outbound” compliance of the state (Italy) 
with international law, but only concerns the internal 
compatibility of two Italian laws with the Italian constitution: 
“The result is a further reduction of the scope of this norm, 
with effects in the domestic legal order only.” (in “The law”, 
para. 3.3., emphasis added). Put differently, the Corte neatly 
distinguishes “internal” and “external” effects of an 
international norm: “The impediment to the incorporation of 
the conventional norm [Article 94 of the United Nations 
Charter] to our legal order – albeit exclusively for the 
purposes of the present case – has no effects on the 
lawfulness of the external norm itself, and therefore results in 
the declaration of unconstitutionality of the special law of 
adaptation, insofar as it contrasts with the abovementioned 
fundamental principles of the Constitution“ (in “The law“, 
para. 4.1, emphasis added). So technically (in a dualist world 
view), the case is not about supremacy but about 
incorporation: “Accordingly, the incorporation, and thus the 
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application, of the international norm would inevitably be 
precluded, insofar as it conflicts with inviolable principles 
and rights. This is exactly what has happened in the present 
case.” (in “The law”, para. 3.4, emphasis added).
The pretense that the “internal” unconstitutionality basically 
does not concern international law, and that the decision 
does not formally accord any priority or supremacy to 
internal law is as unpersuasive as it has been in the ECJ Kadi
judgment (ECJ, Kadi, paras 287-288 and 299). That 
distinction between inside and outside resonates the good 
old 19  century dualism as formulated by Heinrich Triepel, 
according to which international law and domestic law are 
“two circles which at best touch each other but which never 
intersect” (Heinrich Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht 
(Leipzig: Verlag von C. L. Hirschfeld 1899), p. 111, my 
translation).
The Court’s consolation that “in any other case, it is certainly 
clear that the undertaking of the Italian State to respect all 
of the international obligations imposed by the accession to 
the United Nations Charter, including the duty to comply 
with the judgments of the ICJ, remains 
unchanged.” (Sentenza No. 238, in “The law”, para. 4) does 
not help much for managing the practical problem at stake.
What can Germany do in the short term?
Which venues are open for Germany to react lawfully 
against Sentenza No. 238? First, Germany might have 
recourse to the UN Security Council under Art. 94(2) UN 
Charter. This provision is applicable as soon as a UN member 
states “fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it 
under a judgment rendered” by the ICJ. The admission of 
th
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complaints against Germany by Italian courts constitute 
such a failure, because it disregards the procedural barrier 
to domestic judicial proceedings against a state protected by 
immunity. Decisions of Italian courts are imputable to Italy 
(cf. Art. 4 of the ILC articles on state responsibility).
A lex specialis to Art. 94(2) UN Charter seems to be Art. 39 of 
the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes of 29 April 1957, the convention which was the 
jurisdictional basis for the ICJ proceedings that had led to 
the 2012 judgment. Under Art. 39, Germany could appeal to 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which 
could with a 2/3 majority “make recommendations with a 
view to ensuring compliance with the (…) decision” directed 
at Italy.
Instead (in any case after failure of diplomatic 
representations), Germany might institute a new complaint 
against Italy for violation of state immunity, as 
authoritatively spelled out by the ICJ judgment. Remember 
that the ECtHR in Case of Jones and others v. UK (appl. nos. 
34356/06 and 40528/06, judgment of 14 Jan. 2014) had held 
that the judgment of the ICJ in Germany v. Italy “must be 
considered (…) as authoritative as regards the content of 
customary international law” (para. 197).
Res iudicata does not stand against the institution of ICJ-
proceedings, because the disregard of the ICJ judgment of 
2012 constitutes a new issue. Also, the possibility of having 
recourse to the Security Council under Art. 94(2) of the UN 
Charter does not preclude such a complaint, because the 
two venues are in nature distinct (calling on the Security 
Council is a political path as opposed to a judicial path) and 
can be resorted to cumulatively. (On 25 Nov. 2014, one 
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month after the Sentenza No. 238, Italy declared its general 
recognition of the jurisdiction of the ICJ under the optional 
clause of Art. 36(2) ICJ Statute), implicitly inviting a second 
proceeding.)
Sentenza No. 238 itself does not yet constitute an 
internationally wrongful act, because it does not in itself 
disregard state immunity. What counts are the lower courts’ 
reconsiderations of the claims, their decisions on holding 
them admissible by setting aside state immunity. Arguably, 
already the re-opening of those proceedings, not only 
decisions on their merits or the execution of a judgment, 
constitute internationally wrongful acts. The content of 
Italian state responsibility would then be primarily 
restitution in kind which would in our case mean to 
somehow strike down the proceedings against Germany.
Moreover, any execution of a substantive judgment would in 
addition violate post-judgment immunity against execution. 
The relevant parts of the pertinent provision of Art. 19 of the 
UN Convention on State Immunity of 2004 seem to express 
customary international law. The most attractive German 
object of execution, the Villa Vigoni, is protected, because it 
serves governmental objectives in a wider sense, including 
cultural policy, and it has a non-commercial character (ICJ, 
Jurisdictional Immunities, para. 119). Art. 60 sentence 2 of the 
ICJ-Statute does not prevent a new proceeding before the 
ICJ, because this provison is not applicable (Cf. ICJ, Request 
for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the 
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States of America), judgment of 19 January 
2009). The issue is not a one of clarifying the meaning of the 
ICJ judgment of 2012. There is no “dispute as to the meaning 
or scope” of that judgment.
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Another pertinent provision is Art. 30 of the European 
Dispute Settlement Convention of 1957 which deals with the 
situation that the state found in breach of international law 
by the ICJ does not or cannot honour the ICJ judgment: “[I]f 
the municipal law of that party [in our case Italy] does not 
permit or only partially permits” to make good the breach of 
international law found by the ICJ, “the Court (..) shall, if 
necessary, grant the injured party equitable satisfaction.” But 
such a potential new decision by the ICJ could only confer 
“equitable satisfaction”, and this is not what serves Germany.
What should everybody (notably courts) do in the long 
term?
Beyond these conventional, more confrontational means of 
reacting to the Italian breach of international law as it 
stands, all parties are advised to better prevent and manage 
such regime collisions. What is needed is the further 
development of procedural mechanisms of reciprocal 
restraint, respect, and cooperation needed for the 
adjustment of competing claims of authority, in order to 
realize what has been called a “pluralisme ordonné” (Mireille 
Delmas-Marty) – as opposed to a dualism à la Triepel.
Domestic (constitutional) courts do and should take into 
consideration international law in good faith and interpret 
the domestic constitution in the light of international law. 
Along this line, the Corte could have interpreted the 
(constitutional) right of access to a court under Art. 24 of the 
Italian Constitution in the light of ECtHR, Sfountouris v 
Germany, appl. no. 24120/06 (31 May 2011) which implicitly 
held that access to domestic courts (in Germany) in suits for 
damages on account of German World War II-crimes appear 
to satisfy the standards of Art. 6 ECHR (pp. 16-18; this 
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decision on inadmissibility found a claim based on Art. 1 AP 1 
in conjunction with Art. 14 ECHR to be inadmissible ratione 
materiae).
The Corte could have used a more “harmonising” approach à 
la Jones. Here the ECtHR had insisted that both different 
issue areas of international law, the law of immunities, and 
human rights law, must be reconciled, acknowledging “the 
need to interpret the Convention so far as possible in 
harmony with other rules of international law of which it 
forms part, including those relating to the grant of State 
immunity” (ECtHR, Jones para. 189). This led the ECtHR “to 
conclude that measures taken by a State which reflect 
generally recognised rules of public international law on 
State immunity cannot in principle be regarded as imposing 
a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to a 
court” (ibid).
Third, the Corte could have applied the Bosphorus strategy 
(ECtHR, Bosphorus v. Ireland, appl. no 45036/98, 30 June 
2005). In that approach, courts should employ a legal 
presumption that a legal act performed by a body rooted in 
“another” legal system is in conformity with the “own” 
standards, coupled with the reciprocal recognition of such 
acts, “as long as” some minimum requirements are not 
undercut. In this scheme, domestic courts renounce on 
revisiting (judicial or quasi-judicial) decisions taken by an 
international body on the basis of the rebuttable 
presumption that the respective international regime, or 
another state’s domestic legal system (in our case Germany) 
offers a functionally equivalent legal protection.
Most importantly, conflicts between international law and 
constitutional law should be resolved by balancing in the 
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concrete case, not on the basis of a normative hierarchy or 
the norms’ expression in international law as opposed to 
domestic law. Less attention should be paid to the formal 
sources of law, and more to the substance of the rules in 
question. The ranking and effects of the norms at stake 
should be assessed in a more subtle manner, according to 
their substantial weight and significance. Such a 
nonformalist, substance-oriented perspective implies that 
on the one hand certain less significant provisions in state 
constitutions would have to give way to important 
international norms. Inversely, fundamental rights 
guarantees should prevail over less important norms 
(independent of their locus and type of codification). The 
fundamental idea is that what counts is the substance, not 
the formal category of conflicting norms. (Admittedly, this 
new approach does not always offer strict guidance, because 
it is debatable which norms are “important” in terms of 
substance). Still, such a flexible approach appears to 
correspond better with the current state of global legal 
integration than does the idea of a strict hierarchy, 
particularly in human rights matters. From this perspective, 
international law, constitutional law, and other states’ 
constitutional law, too, find themselves in a fluent state of 
interaction and reciprocal influence, based on discourse and 
mutual adaptation, but not in a hierarchical relationship.
Conclusions
The stability of the inter-state system which state immunity 
seeks to protect is sustainable only if it is perceived as being 
fair. The persistence of a de facto non-accountability for 
state-sponsored crimes undermines this sustainability. 
Concededly, the widespread unease about upholding 
immunity even against allegations of serious human rights 
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violations is particularly pronounced in the context of 
criminal proceedings against individual officials who are 
suspect of being personally responsible for ordering or 
commiting crimes. For example, in a criminal proceeding in 
Switzerland against a former Algerian minister of defence, 
instituted for torture, the Swiss Federal Criminal Tribunal 
granted no immunity ratione personae for acts which the 
minister had allegedly committed when still in office (Swiss 
Federal Criminal Tribunal, decision of 25 July 2012, BBl. 2011, 
140).
It is often said that the so-called “civil” (rather “public law”) 
proceedings against states (adressed as juridical persons), 
such as the case underlying Sentenza No. 238, should in 
normative terms be assessed differently from criminal 
proceedings against individuals, and that – if at all – a human 
rights exception is more appropriate in the latter context. I 
hesitate to agree. In cases of torture and the like, the 
criminals are normally office holders whose actions are 
imputable to states, so that both tracks (individual criminal 
responsibility and state responsibility) will normally be 
pursued in parallel. From the perspective of the victim, it is 
not self-evident that the claim against a juridical person 
which seeks a statement of state responsibility and damages 
should be less worthy of being honoured than the request 
for a criminal penalty against a perpetrator. For example, the 
recent important ECtHR case, Jones v. UK, was a case on 
state immunity (involving Saudi Arabia) against allegations of 
torture. Here the ECtHR observed that “in light of the 
developments currently under way in this area of public 
international law, this is a matter which needs to be kept 
under review” (para. 215). However, in comparison to such 
type of dispute about torture of current or recent regimes, 
the issue of the Italian prisoners of war makes a bad case for 
Page 12 of 16Let Not Triepel Triumph | Völkerrechtsblog
25.01.2017http://voelkerrechtsblog.org/let-not-triepel-triumph/
two reasins. First, an international law-based entitlement of 
victims of of violations of the law of armed conflict to 
financial compensation is still denied by most domestic 
courts. Second, the claim concerns crimes committed more 
than one generation ago. Even if we do not accept any 
formal prescription for the prosecution of such egregious 
crimes, the lapse of time does weaken the claims.
Is the openness of the question “who decides who decides” 
and the lack of an ultimate authority – in our context for 
example a tribunal sitting over and above the ICJ and the 
Italian Corte Costituzionale – a merit of the global order? In 
theory, such openness constitutes an additional mechanism 
for limiting power and seems to allow for a heterarchical 
adjustment of regimes. Within this paradigm, the 
constitutional resistance of the Corte Costituzionale might 
be interpreted as the pulling of an “emergency brake” whose 
availability had been the pre-condition for the opening-up of 
the states’ constitutions towards the international sphere in 
the first place. Along this line, one could argue that – in the 
absence of a super-arbiter − the Italian courts are entitled to 
act as “guardians” of rights of the victims or their 
descendants “as long as” a customary human rights 
exception to state immunity has not cristallized or until a 
special agreement between Germay and Italy, on a special 
indemnation programme or a special claims tribunal, has 
been concluded.
In the long run, reasonable resistance by national actors – if 
it is exercised under respect of the principles for ordering 
pluralism, notably in good faith and with due regard for the 
overarching ideal of international cooperation – might build 
up the political pressure needed for promoting the 
progressive evolution of international law in the direction of 
Page 13 of 16Let Not Triepel Triumph | Völkerrechtsblog
25.01.2017http://voelkerrechtsblog.org/let-not-triepel-triumph/
a system more considerate of human rights. Indeed, such 
domestic resistance has in the past had salutary effects in 
the sense that it stimulated an improvement of the attacked 
regime’s fundamental rights protection: In reaction to the 
German Constitutional Court’s Solange I decision, the 
EC/EU formalised its scheme of fundamental rights 
protection culminating in the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and – perhaps – the accession of the EU 
to the ECHR. Arguably, it has been in reaction to the ECJ’s 
Kadi decision and its progeny that the United Nations 1267-
sanctions regime was complemented with an ombudsman 
procedure (UN SC Res 1904 (2009)) which has been gradually 
improved (UN SC Res. 1989 (2011)).
Superficially, the Sentenza No. 238 strengthens the position 
of the individual against the state. But on a more profound 
level, it strengthens unilateralism over universalism: It gives 
priority to one (state’s) national outlook about what 
constitutes a proper legal order over the universal standard 
pronounced by an international court. Concededly, this ICJ-
standard is unsatisfactory and seems to be biased in favour 
of the stability of an inter-state system. On the other hand it 
still has the merit of being universal. The lack of an ultimate 
arbiter tends to result in the political dominance of the more 
powerful actors which are normally the domestic ones such 
as the Italian Constiutional Court. And a stiff dualism à la 
Tripel and Tesauro bears the real risk of reinforcing the 
perception that international law is only soft law or even no 
law at all.
Despite its staunch dualism, the Corte insinuates that 
(somehow), the two legal circles (to use Triepel’s term) may 
interact: “At the same time, however, this [declaration of 
unconstitutionality] may also contribute to a desirable – and 
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desired by many – evolution of international law itself” (ibid., 
in “The law”, para. 3.3.). However: You cannot have the cake 
and eat it, too.
Anne Peters is Director at the Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg 
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